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Abstract 
Instead of catching up with advanced economies, most middle-income countries have remained 
stuck in a middle-income trap. We identify and analyse the triple challenges of ‘breaking into’ 
the global economy, ‘linking up’ into global value chains while ‘linking back’ to the local 
production system, and ‘keeping pace’ with technological change and innovation. We focus 
specifically on what we term the ‘middle-income technology trap’: specific structural and 
institutional configurations that are not conducive to increasing domestic value addition and to 
sustained industrial and technological upgrading. We explore this through case studies of 
China, Brazil and South Africa and the analysis of the evolution of their industrial policies and 
specific institutions, specifically InnoFund model in China, the Embrapa system in Brazil, and 
the Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme in South Africa. Industrial 
policy implications for middle-income countries in particular, and for developing countries 
more widely, are finally discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the world economy has undergone profound structural 
transformations. Despite a number of catching-up economies having registered fast economic 
growth and industrialisation in this period, world industrial production has on the whole 
remained highly concentrated. Today, fewer than twenty countries control 80% of world 
manufacturing value-addition , with similar patterns in net value addition in international trade 
(OECD, 2018). While a few countries – notably China – have managed to significantly expand 
their shares of world manufacturing production, the majority of low- and middle-income 
countries remain outside of this group of leading industrialised nations.  
 
Countries that are classified in the group of middle-income countries are highly heterogeneous 
with respect to the structural composition of their economies, their levels of technological 
capabilities, and their experiences of premature deindustrialisation (Tregenna, 2009). 
Moreover, throughout their development history, these countries have faced different external 
forces, both in terms of the global industrial landscape and global policy regime. The 
interaction between these internal and external dynamics have shaped the different structures 
and trajectories of these middle-income economies (Kang and Paus, 2019).  
 
However, if we focus our attention on the major groups of middle-income economies across 
the global south – South and East Asia, Latin America and Africa – we can identify important 
commonalities. Governments in these countries have tended to address the risks of being stuck 
in the so-called middle-income trap by increasingly shifting their industrial policy focus to 
targeted production and technology policies. More specifically, while the strategic approaches 
and industrial policy instruments used by these countries are different, they focus on avoiding 
what we call here a middle-income technology trap, that is, a specific structural and institutional 
configuration of the economy that is not conducive to increasing domestic value addition and 
to sustained industrial and technological upgrading.  
 
We argue that a middle-income technology trap results from three main interdependent factors: 
first, constraints in terms of scale and technological competitiveness, and thus the challenge of 
‘breaking into’ a persistently concentrated global industry; second, the challenges faced by 
domestic companies in effectively ‘linking up’ to global value chains (GVCs), while also 
‘linking back’ to the domestic production system; third, the challenge of ‘keeping pace’ with 
technological change and innovation. In addressing each one of these challenges, middle-
income countries can adopt different institutions and deploy different industrial policies. 
 
This paper investigates the specific structural configuration challenges faced by countries stuck 
in this middle-income technology trap, and focuses on the different institutional and industrial 
policy responses formulated in efforts to escape the trap by three major economies– namely 
China, Brazil and South Africa. First, we provide a historical analysis of industrial policies in 
these three countries – in particular what they did in breaking into and linking up to the global 
economy, as well as linking back into the domestic economy. Against this historical 
background analysis, we then focus on the specific turning point at which specific institutions 
and policies have been introduced and implemented to address the challenge of keeping pace 
with technological change and innovation. To address this specific challenge, middle-income 
countries need targeted investments to develop production, technological and innovation 
capabilities across different ‘technology types’ and along different ‘stages of technological 
development’ – from research to technology scaling-up, commercialisation, and effective 
deployment in production operations.  
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We claim that, given the weaknesses in the national industrial and innovation systems of 
middle-income countries, these different stages of technological development can be hampered 
by several investment gaps. Our country cases show that these investment gaps can be 
addressed with different policy responses. Specifically, we discuss (i) the ‘funding innovation 
model’ and hybrid financial solutions, focusing on the early stages of technological innovation 
adopted under the InnoFund model in China; (ii) the ‘intermediate technology institution’ 
model supporting product, process and technology scaling-up stages adopted under the 
Embrapa system in Brazil; and (iii) the ‘matching grant commercialisation’ model of the 
Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme, focusing on the later stages of 
technology absorption and development in South Africa. 
 
These institutional solutions and policy instruments are embedded in different industrial policy 
packages that have evolved from specific structural and political economy dynamics (Andreoni 
and Chang, 2019; Chang and Andreoni, 2020). Drawing on an in-depth analysis of the specific 
design, implementation and enforcement mechanisms adopted by these countries, the paper 
finally provides a comparative analysis of these alternative models, with a focus on their 
effectiveness and governance challenges. In the comparative analysis, we situate these different 
institutional solutions and policies against technological readiness levels (TRLs), a metric 
widely used among high-income and some middle-income countries to characterise different 
stages of technological development. We show how lessons from these three major schemes in 
three of the so-called BRICS countries can be applied to other countries that are similarly 
affected by (or are in the process of approaching) a ‘middle-income technology trap’.  
 
2. Middle-income trap? Towards a structural understanding of the industrialisation 
challenges of middle-income countries 
 
2.1 The ‘middle-income trap’ 
 
The world’s middle-income countries (MICs) are a heterogeneous group of more than 200 
countries that are home to five billion of the world’s seven billion population (and 73% of the 
world’s poor people) and generate half of global GDP (World Bank, 2018). Among the 101 
economies classified as ‘middle-income’ in 1960, only 14 had become ‘high-income’ by 2008 
(World Bank, 2013). This group includes Ireland and the Southern European countries, the fast 
industrialising tigers of East Asia, and a few small resource-rich countries in Africa. Not only 
did so few countries manage to graduate to high-income status, in recent years a number of 
middle-income countries have witnessed a slowdown in their economic growth after reaching 
middle-income levels.  
 
The concept of the ‘middle-income trap’ was introduced in a research report by the World 
Bank, titled An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth. In this report, Gill and 
Kharas (2008:18) discuss the idea of the middle-income trap:  
In the absence of economies of scale, East Asian middle-income countries would face an uphill 
struggle to maintain their historically impressive growth. Strategies based on factor accumulation 
are likely to deliver steadily worse results, which is a natural occurrence as the marginal productivity 
of capital declines. Latin America and the Middle East are examples of middle-income regions that, 
for decades, have been unable to escape this trap (italics added). 
 
Despite the term ‘middle-income trap’ itself remaining largely under-theorised (see, for 
instance, Felipe et al., 2017; Bresser-Pereira et al. 2020), it has since been used widely in the 
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development literature and policy discourse to describe stagnant growth in both absolute and 
relative terms. It suggests a situation of a long-term, stagnating equilibrium in terms of per 
capita income, and thus failure to maintain sustained economic growth and catch-up towards 
the high-income level of developed countries. For example, Arias and Wen (2015) define an 
‘income trap’ as the phenomenon of an economy’s aggregate income per capita failing to grow 
faster than that of the United States (US), which is taken as the benchmark for the developed 
world. A situation in which an economy’s income per capita relative to the US remains 
constantly and substantially below 50% is denoted a (relative) middle-income trap. Gill and 
Kharas (2008) refer to a (relative) low-income trap (or poverty trap) in cases when it remains 
significantly below 10%. Felipe (2012) provides a working empirical definition of the middle-
income trap, with the results suggesting that a country attaining lower middle-income status 
must grow at least 4.7% per annum on average to avoid being caught in a trap, with the 
corresponding rate for upper middle-income countries being 3.5%. 
 
A growing literature has attempted to understand the middle-income trap and its global 
structural dynamics (for reviews, see Kang and Paus, 2019; Wade, 2016). Among them, a 
number of specific industrialisation challenges faced by middle-income countries have been 
identified. For example, scholars have pointed to the challenges that middle-income countries 
face in sustaining sufficiently high rates of labour productivity growth over a long period of 
time. From this perspective, Justin Lin (2017:6) suggests that “[t]he middle-income trap is a 
result of a middle-income country’s failure to have a faster labor productivity growth through 
technological innovation and industrial upgrading than high-income countries”.  
 
Along similar lines, but with a focus on global competitive dynamics, other scholars (see, for 
instance, Lee, 2013; Lee and Ramanayake, 2018; and the empirical review by Im and 
Rosenblat, 2013) argue that a source of the middle-income trap is the difficulty of these 
countries to gain space in the global market. Competing with low-wage and large-scale 
exporters presents a fundamental challenge, given their lower price competitiveness in terms 
of wages and scale-efficient production. For middle-income countries that have reached 
relatively large-scale production, competition with technologically advanced economies is 
difficult because their industrial capabilities are not yet sufficiently developed to give them a 
competitive advantage. 
 
Other scholars have linked the middle-income trap to premature deindustrialisation in middle-
income countries (Andreoni and Tregenna, 2019). Premature deindustrialisation represents a 
major threat to developing countries’ prospects of sustained catching up. The reason for this is 
that, by shrinking their manufacturing base, premature deindustrialisation reduces 
opportunities for the development and accumulation of technological capabilities and, as a 
result, countries’ capacity to add value in GVCs and tradable sectors, and their scope for 
innovation and productivity growth. Where a country’s manufacturing sector is 
underdeveloped or has shrunk through premature deindustrialisation, this undermines its ability 
to sustain productivity growth at the rates required for catching up.  
 
Political scientists have recently emphasised the role that institutions and interests play in 
different political economy contexts in addressing middle-income challenges. Doner and 
Schneider (2016) emphasise institutional co-ordination and the emergence of upgrading 
coalitions as central for escaping the middle-income trap. Sen and Tyce (2019) point to the 
relationship between the state and business in the case of Malaysia and Thailand, and how the 
patronage-based relationship has affected their technological upgrading. Finally, Klingler-
Vidra and Wade (2019) focus on the gaps in national innovation systems and entrepreneurship 
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to explain the challenges faced by Vietnam in its upgrading, while Doner and Schneider (2019) 
have documented the challenges faced by Malaysia in developing its technical and vocational 
education system to escape the middle-income trap.  
 
The literature on the middle-income trap thus points to several industrialisation challenges that 
are intertwined and that reinforce each other in different ways along different countries’ 
structural, institutional and political economy trajectories. These challenges also present 
potential opportunities for middle-income countries to industrialise and develop. Capturing 
these opportunities is conditional, however, on appropriate institutional and policy responses.  
 
In the analysis that follows, we suggest the need to go deeper in our understanding of these 
industrialisation challenges by considering the specific structural factors responsible for the 
middle-income trap. We argue that there are three key challenges – ‘breaking into’, ‘linking up 
and back’ and ‘keeping pace’ – which we discuss further below. Against this analytical 
background, we focus in the following sections on specific institutional and policy responses 
adopted by different middle-income countries, and assess the extent to which the selected 
countries have managed to turn these challenges into opportunities for technological upgrading. 
 
2.2 Breaking into: Global concentration, compression and reconfiguration of 
manufacturing production 
 
Over the last two decades, the global industrial landscape has been reshaped by profound 
structural transformations and the shifting around geographically of manufacturing production. 
These dramatic transformations started in the mid-1990s and led to the ‘great convergence’ 
between the most industrialised nations and a relatively small group of economies that were 
catching up fast. Between 1995 and 2010, the G7 countries lost significant shares of value 
addition. In particular, their shares in world manufacturing value added (WMVA) registered a 
major decline. In 1995, the two leading industrial nations – the US and Japan – together 
contributed more than 40% of WMVA, while Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom 
(UK) contributed another 25%. South Korea and Canada each controlled another 2% of 
WMVA at that time. This means that fewer than ten nations controlled more than 70% of world 
manufacturing in 1995. By 2011, less than 15 years later, all the G7 countries together 
accounted for only 40% of the WMVA, although their manufacturing value added in absolute 
terms kept increasing steadily until the 2007 financial crisis.  
 
During the same period (between 1995 and 2010), a group of emerging economies more than 
doubled their joint WMVA shares from 18% to 36% (Figure 1)1. This process of convergence 
has been driven by the rise of the new industrial superpower – China – and a group of fast 
catching-up economies. China moved from contributing less than 5% of WMVA in 1995 to 
10% in 2005, and more than 20% in 2011, reaching almost 23% in 2014. As a result, China’s 
share in world value-added exports surged to 17% in 2014, seven percentage points ahead of 
the second world-leading exporter – Germany – and more than double that of the US. Between 
2000 and 2010, India, Russia and Brazil almost doubled their WMVA shares to pass the 2.5% 
threshold, while Indonesia approached almost 2% by 2010. As can be seen in Figure 1, the rest 
of the ‘top 16’ (excluding the G7) significantly grew its manufacturing production over this 
                                                          
1 Figure 1 shows data from TiVA OECD 2016 edition, which covers the period 1995 to 2011. While the updated 
TiVA OECD 2018 edition extends to 2014, it has a shorter overall timespan and only goes back to 2005, missing 
the previous decade, in which the impact of the rise of China is apparent. The same applies to Figure 2, which 
goes up to 2011. 
6 
 
period. However, a number of middle-income countries, including South Africa, were only 
marginally involved in this great convergence, as reflected in their WMVA shares. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The great convergence and global concentration  
Source: Authors, based on TiVA OECD 
Note: “Others Top16” includes countries other than the G7 that were in the top 16 for manufacturing 
value added in 2011: China, Korea, Brazil, India, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico, Spain and Turkey.  
 
 
Taken together – G7 plus the rest of the ‘top 16’ shown in Figure 1 – only 16 countries 
accounted for 80% of the world total MVA in 2011.We thus see an ongoing concentration of 
manufacturing production amongst a relatively small group of countries, combined with a 
reconfiguration of those shares. The G7 countries no longer command the same high share of 
global manufacturing as was previously the case, due to the rise of China and a relatively small 
group of emerging industrial economies, yet the G7 share remains high. The next tier of 
emerging manufacturers – shown here as the group of 16 – has to some extent closed the gap 
with the advanced economies in a number of economic sectors. However, even this emerging 
group of countries is itself highly concentrated, and the development of one country in one 
sector tends to lead to a fast process of global concentration. We have indeed entered what 
some scholars have called a phase of ‘compressed development’ (Whittaker et al., 2020).2  
 
                                                          
2 See also Haraguchi et al. (2017) on the shifting patterns of manufacturing internationally, in which 
manufacturing activities have become increasingly concentrated in a small number of populous developing 
countries. 
7 
 
We thus see the persistence of concentration, but in a reconfigured form, along with 
compression. On the one hand, the success of the rest of the ‘top 16’ in ‘breaking in’ 
demonstrates the possibilities of industrialisation and of eating into the share of the advanced 
economies. On the other hand, global manufacturing production remains concentrated and 
compressed, with most middle-income countries failing to break in, and in fact experiencing 
deindustrialisation. 
 
This persistent concentration and compression in global manufacturing – both at the country 
and sectoral levels – have made it very difficult for middle-income countries to break into 
medium- and high-tech production activities. Barriers to this breaking in – that did not face 
earlier industrialisers (or at least not to the same extent) – include realising global-scale 
economies, intellectual property rights, institutions and capabilities for technological 
development and innovation. The emergence of major national champions and multinational 
companies operating globally has also introduced new forms of direct and indirect (via global 
supply chains) competition in middle-income countries’ domestic markets. The very success 
of countries such as China, with their large markets and ability to realise economies of scale, 
and effective institutions and policies (as discussed further below), simultaneously opens up 
some opportunities for other middle-income countries, and makes their own route to 
industrialisation and structural transformation more difficult. 
 
2.3 Linking up and back: Global value chain integration and domestic value addition 
 
GVC upgrading is the process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move to 
more profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital- and skills-intensive economic 
activities – higher value-creation potential – and capture the value created from them. 
Upgrading can take different forms of ‘linking up’, including: (i) Process upgrading, which 
typically refers to improved production methods that transform inputs into final products more 
efficiently through the reorganisation of production or the introduction of superior technology; 
(ii) Product upgrading, which is moving into more sophisticated product lines in terms of 
higher unit-value products, rather than moving to a different part of the value chain; (iii) 
Functional upgrading, which involves performing new, superior functions in the chain, such 
as design or marketing, or abandoning existing low value-added functions to focus on higher 
value-added activities; and (iv) Intersectoral upgrading, which entails applying the 
competence acquired in a particular function or industry to move into a new sector (Ponte et 
al., 2019). 
 
The GVC framework stresses the opportunities for companies to specialise in specific 
production tasks or components, preferably ‘high-value niches’, while avoiding the building 
up of entire vertically integrated industrial sectors or blocks of industries (Gereffi, 2013; 
Milberg and Winkler, 2013). The idea of a selective form of specialisation in tasks, driven by 
capturing value opportunities, would encourage companies to upgrade incrementally towards 
activities such as research and development (R&D), design and downstream post-sale services. 
 
First-tier suppliers and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) companies in middle-income 
countries, however, face multiple challenges in linking up to the GVC, especially moving into 
more technologically sophisticated segments of GVCs. First, focusing on the production of 
low-value-added parts and components does not automatically lead to the upgrading of 
domestic technological capabilities, especially given the endogenous asymmetries 
characterising GVCs (Andreoni, 2019; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Raj-Reichert, 2019) and 
the higher capability threshold that companies have to reach to engage with digital production 
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technologies . Moreover, in a number of cases, middle-income countries that have attempted 
to integrate globally have also ended up ‘de-linking domestically’ and hollowing out the 
domestic manufacturing sector. Under these conditions, a combination of weak productivity 
growth and rising labour costs, or the emergence of alternative lower-cost locations, might lead 
to declining profitability, disengagement by the lead firm and a further weakening of domestic 
productive capacity. 
 
In contrast, by linking up to international companies and system integrators while ‘linking 
back’ to local producers and local supply chains – local production system development – 
domestic companies can capture international demand and learn from exporting (Andreoni, 
2019). South Korea and Taiwan between 1970 and 1990, and China in the 1980s and 1990s, 
all started their industrialisation by linking (backwards) to global supply chains and adding 
value (forwards) in electronics and other industries, starting in particular from those 
characterised by short technology cycles (Lee, 2013). With the expansion of the local 
production system, more opportunities for backward integration also open up, as domestic 
companies start importing more intermediate goods while diversifying their export baskets. 
Lee et al. (2017) describe this successful catching-up process as an ‘in-out-in-again’ model of 
integration into GVC. 
 
Over the last two decades, a very small number of middle-income countries have been 
successful in linking up while linking back. That is, only a few of them have managed to 
involve OEMs, and first-, second- and third-tier domestically located companies in value-
creation processes. Thus, domestic value-added performances reflect the extent to which 
countries have been able to build up their technological capabilities and take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by forward integration into GVCs.3 While the value of world imports 
more than doubled during the 2000s, and with intermediate goods making up 65% of world 
imports in 2011, backward integration in GVCs among major middle-income countries was 
not very successful between 1990 and 2010.  
 
Figure 2 presents domestic value-added performances across a range of major middle-income 
countries, showing the diversity of GVC integration trajectories. China presents a unique case 
among these countries, having managed to increase its backward integration (measured in 
terms of foreign value added (FVA) in trade) by linking up globally in the 1990s, and then 
increase its domestic value addition by linking back domestically throughout the 2000s. In 
contrast, South Africa has seen a steady increase in foreign domestic value added in trade 
(despite its export basket being skewed towards minerals) throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
Brazil can be seen as an intermediate case, with moderate growth in FVA (i.e. decline in DVA) 
during the 1990s, followed by the proportions of FVA and DVA remaining roughly constant 
on average over the 2000s.  
                                                          
3 DVA measured as (1 – FVA) in manufacturing products captures the extent to which a country is able to add 
value to its products. The value addition can be the result of several types of activity, including extracting and 
processing raw materials; designing a product; producing components; integrating or assembling product systems; 
and adding services to products downstream in the value chain. To capture the extent to which a country has 
engaged in value-addition activities, it is critical to measure only net value addition, thus excluding the value that 
results from buying goods and services from abroad. 
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Figure 2: Backward integration in GVCs among major middle-income countries 
Source: Authors, based on TIVA 
 
The different levels of performance in value addition discussed above are thus the result of a 
specific structural configuration of the production system of middle-income countries – their 
sectoral/task specialisation and the weakness of their domestically located supply chains. 
Opportunities for value addition – both value creation and value capture – are unevenly 
distributed across different sectoral value chains. However, they generally reflect the 
technological capabilities involved in production (Andreoni and Tregenna, 2019; Chang and 
Andreoni, 2020). This means that, in order to link up and back successfully, middle-income 
countries have to address a fundamental problem of technological upgrading. And they have 
to do that fast enough to overcome the so called ‘Red Queen Effect’ – that is, the fact that 
“middle income countries have to move to innovation-based growth more quickly, just to stay 
in the same place, let alone move up” (Kang and Paus, 2019:3). 
 
2.4 Keeping pace with technological change and innovation 
 
In a concentrated and GVC dominated industrial landscape, keeping pace with technological 
change and innovation is a twofold challenge for middle-income countries. The reason is that 
their investments and capability building efforts need to target both the development of 
different ‘types’ of technologies as well as different ‘stages’ of technological development. We 
consider each of these in turn. 
 
First, countries need to develop technological capabilities across different ‘technology types’, 
as different types of technologies are required to absorb and adapt foreign technologies as well 
as to produce and innovate on them. For example, developing generic technologies is not 
sufficient if their development is not complemented by other types of technologies which 
translate them into products for the market.  
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Tassey (2007) distinguishes at least three types of technologies. First, there are ‘proprietary 
technologies’, which generally are associated with specific products (e.g. a certain machine, or 
a critical component of a sophisticated product system, for instance the membrane of a medical 
device or the mechatronic system underpinning a robotic solution) or industrial transformation 
processes (e.g. a certain chemical process that allows the production of a composite material 
for the aerospace industry). The latter type of proprietary technologies used in industrial 
processes are also called production technologies (e.g. robots performing laser welding in the 
automotive industry).  
 
Proprietary technologies are generally developed by companies – private or state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) – that are operating in one or more markets with their own brands or as 
OEMs or suppliers. However, despite their commercial differences, they are all based on a set 
of ‘generic technologies’ that emerge from the science base of one or more countries, their 
universities, industrial research centres and laboratories, or military and health system 
institutions. Large private companies are also involved in the development of some of these 
generic technologies, often in collaboration with government-funded institutions or relying on 
public funding and grants.  
 
The development of these different types of generic and proprietary technologies, including 
production technologies, often requires companies and other institutions to have access to 
‘infra-technologies’ (Link and Scott, 2011). Historically, the quasi-public-good nature of these 
technologies makes the involvement of government institutions in the funding and provision 
of/access to these technologies natural. Moreover, while some of these infra-technologies are 
relatively inexpensive, others are prohibitive for small companies and, in some cases, can 
operate only under an open system and a regulated model. Thus, there are different types of 
technologies and different private and public players can be – and historically across countries 
have been – involved in their development (Block and Keller, 2009). 
 
Second, investments in these technological capabilities need to be carefully allocated along 
different ‘stages of technological development’ – from research to technology scaling-up, 
commercialisation, and effective deployment in production operations – and have to be 
significant enough to compete globally. For example, a country with investments concentrated 
in basic research only, will find it difficult to scale up technological innovation. 
 
Technological development follows different stages and can be measured in different ways 
(Hall and Rosenberg, 2010). Traditionally, scholars have distinguished five stages of 
technology development – research, concept/invention, early-stage technology development, 
product development, and production/commercialisation. Borrowing from the aerospace 
industry, other scholars and policymakers have, over the last two decades, increasingly relied 
on a more granular technology metric called ‘technological readiness levels’ (TRLs) (Mankins, 
2009). The TRL metric focuses on the technology innovation development stages and makes 
it possible to assess the extent to which technologies (e.g. machinery, equipment or software) 
are ready to be deployed in production in an operating plant. TRLs comprise a nine-point scale 
based on a qualitative assessment of maturity, clustered around four main phases: research 
(TRL 1-3), development (TRL 4-6), deployment (TRL 7-8) and operations (TRL 9). 
 
As shown in Figure 3, among industrially advanced western economies, the TRL metric has 
been especially used to draw attention to what has been called a ‘valley of death’ represented 
by potential investment gaps in technology development stages TRL 4-5-6. Indeed, in 
advanced economies, governments tend to invest heavily in research – at least comparatively 
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– and firms are typically keen to invest in technologies that have proven to be deployable and 
ready to the market. Not only is this valley larger in middle-income countries, that is, several 
stages of technology development are underfunded (horizontal arrow), but moreover those 
stages in which the government or the private sector invests tend to be funded at lower levels 
(vertical arrows). The combination of these two dimensions make keeping pace with 
technological change and innovation particularly challenging for middle-income countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Keeping pace with technological change and innovation challenge 
Source: Authors 
 
 
The reasons why middle-income countries tend to be in a weaker position when it comes to 
keeping pace with technological change and innovation has to do with two aspects. First, the 
government tends to have a much lower investment capacity in basic science relative to leading 
industrial nations. As a result, firms in middle-income countries might not be able to leverage 
a well-funded and diversified domestic science base that provides access to generic 
technologies. Companies are also unable or unwilling to make significant investments in basic 
research, as the long-term capital commitment is prohibitively high and/or too risky. The fact 
that the industrial base in these countries has limited diversification and technological depth 
also means that the scaling up of the new product or technology has to rely on external inputs. 
For instance, production technologies are designed and produced abroad, so middle-income 
countries mainly use expensive foreign technologies. Finally, the technological weakness and 
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fragmentation of the domestic production system means that access to infra-technologies tends 
to be limited to private companies. 
 
Many of the specific challenges associated with keeping pace with technological change and 
innovation are intrinsically linked to the other two set of challenges discussed above, that is, 
breaking into global markets and linking up into GVC while developing domestic production 
systems. The combination of these three set of challenges – what we have called the middle-
income technology trap – can be addressed with different industrial policies and institutions. 
For example, governments can rely on fiscal incentives and subsidies in the form of research 
grants to support firms’ investments in research and technological upgrading. Another option 
is to provide technology services – thus, non-financial incentives – to overcome access to 
specific capabilities that companies in middle-income countries might be missing. Each of 
these choices potentially determine the effectiveness of industrial policy in overcoming the 
middle-income technology trap. 
 
3. Industrial policies in middle-income countries: China, Brazil and South Africa 
 
In this section, we investigate the specific strategies followed by three major middle-income 
countries from three geographic regions: China, Brazil and South Africa. These countries have 
followed very different structural trajectories and have engaged with the specific challenges of 
breaking into, linking up (and back), and keeping pace highlighted above at different points in 
time, with different policies and institutions, and with different outcomes. Figure 4 shows the 
contrasting economic trajectories of the three countries over time. Brazil and South Africa both 
held upper-middle-income status throughout this period, apart from Brazil during the years 
2002 to 2005 and South Africa during the years 1998 and 2001 to 2003, in which they were 
classified as lower-middle-income countries. China, by contrast, began this period as a lower-
income country, first reaching lower-middle-income status in 1997 and continuously from 
1999 onwards, ascending to upper-middle-income status from 2010. Stark differences between 
the three countries are apparent in terms of MVA per capita. In China, MVA per capita grew 
faster than GNI per capita over this period, in contrast to the deindustrialisation evident in both 
Brazil and South Africa. China ended the period with MVA per capita far above that of the 
other two countries. Overall, the picture is one of industrialisation and dynamic growth in 
China, with deindustrialisation and stagnation in Brazil and South Africa.  
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Figure 4: GNI and MVA per capita in China, Brazil and South Africa, 1990 to 2018 
Notes: GNI per capita (in constant 2010 US$) is depicted in grey, with values on the left-hand axis. 
MVA per capita (in constant 2010 US$) is depicted in black, with values on the right-hand axis. China 
is shown in solid lines (GNI data only available for 1995 to 2017); Brazil is shown in long-dashed lines 
and South Africa in dotted lines.  
Source: GNI per capita from World Bank World Development Indicators, MVA per capita calculated 
from UNIDO INDSTAT 
 
3.1 China 
 
Since the late 1970s, industrial policy has been an integral part of China’s five-year planning. 
In 1989, the concept of industrial policy was explicitly mentioned for the first time in an official 
document (the State Council’s paper, Decision on Current Industrial Policy Priorities). This 
was followed in 1994 by the more comprehensive and integrated Outline of State Industrial 
Policies for the 1990s, which emphasised the development of mainstay and high-technology 
industries, and the need to readjust the composition of foreign trade by strengthening 
manufacturing competitiveness. Many initiatives and policy measures, especially in the early 
period, were inspired by the successful experiences of Japan and Korea and focused on 
breaking into the global economy by linking up to value chains. The Sixth Plan (1981 to 1985) 
marked a more outward-oriented approach, focusing on importing technologies and developing 
endogenous technological and innovation capabilities. Thus, since the 1980s, China started 
using several policy instruments to link back and develop linkages to the local production 
system and keep pace with technological change.  
 
3.1.1 Breaking into, linking up and back 
 
China is the most successful country in the process of great convergence that started from the 
mid-1990s, as measured in WMVA shares (see section 2). China’s successful breaking into the 
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global market resulted from a first phase of linking up to global value chains, followed by an 
incremental process of linking back to and technological upgrading of the domestic production 
system. To achieve these complementary sets of goals, China adopted a selective approach to 
industrial policy. Strategic industries, or ‘pillar industries’, were identified based on their 
importance to China’s national security and economy (e.g. defence, coal, electric power, 
telecommunications, petroleum and petrochemicals, civil aviation and shipping) and growth 
potential (e.g. alternative-fuel cars, biotechnology, environmental and energy-saving 
technologies, alternative energy, advanced materials, new-generation information technology, 
and high-end equipment manufacturing).  
 
Achieving industrial competitiveness in these strategic industries, and thus becoming capable 
of breaking into global markets and value chains, relied heavily on the development of a 
‘national team’ of state enterprises and the strategic use of trade policies (Nolan, 2001; 
Sutherland, 2003). SOEs played a critical role in co-ordinating processes of industrial 
upgrading and restructuring, in some cases limiting domestic competition to achieve economies 
of scale and overcome entry barriers. SOEs benefited from incentives and preferential loan 
terms. Between 1998 and 2003, SOEs received 65% of all commercial bank loans, despite 
accounting for only a quarter of China’s economy (Ferri and Liu, 2010:54). Imputed interest 
rates on debts offered to SOEs were 20% to 25% lower than those offered to private enterprises 
between 1999 and 2003 (Ferri and Liu, 2010:55).  
 
Each targeted sector also received a package of complementary industrial policy measures, 
including tariff and non-tariff barriers, import quotas, local content requirements, licencing 
systems, tax exemptions, subsidised land, and subsidised loans from state-owned policy banks. 
Firms from prioritised industries benefited from subsidised loans from development banks, 
such as the Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China, the Agricultural Development Bank of China 
(ADBC), and the China Development Bank (CDB). The overall financial infrastructure was 
also given a pro-industrial development orientation by law4. 
 
The development of an industrial base was also made possible by a strategic engagement with 
leading foreign companies controlling global value chains. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
policies were widely used by China in linking up to global value chains while creating the 
conditions for the development of domestic production linkages. The June 1995 Provisional 
Regulations of Guidance on Foreign Direct Investment mapped out guidelines for targeting 
FDI in desired high-technology sectors, and a list of encouraged, restricted or prohibited 
foreign investments was recorded in the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue. 
Targeted industries typically involved high-end manufacturing, new and advanced 
technologies, energy efficiency and environmental protection. The automobile and 
semiconductor industries, for example, were guaranteed market protection in exchange for 
technology transfer, while increases in companies’ production scales were reached through 
government-led mergers and acquisitions (Lo and Wu, 2014). 
 
Linking back into the domestic production system and promoting its technological upgrading 
were achieved by steering industrial consolidation and strategic mergers and acquisitions 
among domestic firms, as well as encouraging joint ventures with foreign companies. To 
facilitate technological transfers from more advanced economies, China offered tax incentives 
                                                          
4 For instance, Chapter IV, Article 34 of the 1995 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks 
indicates that “[a] commercial bank shall conduct its loan business in accordance with the need for the 
development of the national economy and social progress and under the guidance of the state industrial policy” 
(for a discussion, see Andreoni, 2016). 
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to entice foreign companies to establish R&D centres, and imposed technology-import 
regulations and ownership restrictions. To conform to the ownership restrictions, transnational 
corporations (TNCs) formed joint ventures with Chinese companies. Such joint ventures 
ultimately allowed the state to retain effective control over foreign affiliates so as to advance 
Chinese interests (Roehrig, 1994). The development of the local production systems also relied 
on cluster policies, as well as export-promotion zones. For example, the Innovation Clusters 
programme was aligned with the development of National High-Tech Zones (NHTZs) and 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs). 
 
China’s automobile industry offers an example of a sector that benefited from this complex 
package of industrial policies. Before the 1980s, the automotive industry comprised largely of 
SOEs, including First Automobile Works (FAW), Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation 
(BAIC), Dongfeng Motor Corporation, and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 
(SAIC). In the 1980s, the automotive industry was identified as one of China’s pillar industries 
for driving its economic development. Although foreign investors benefited from tax 
exemptions and subsidised land, they were highly regulated, with local content requirements 
and joint venture rules with indigenous firms (foreign shareholding was capped at 50%). 
Examples of early joint ventures include BAIC and American Motors Company, and SAIC and 
Volkswagen. Import tariffs and quotas were imposed using an infant industry strategy, with 
import tariffs as high as 200% to 300% in the 1980s, and 100% to 200% in the early 1990s 
(Huang, 2003:260). It was only in the late 1990s that the government loosened entry restrictions 
on foreign automobile manufacturers. 
 
The market liberalisation agenda in the second part of the 1990s brought various changes in 
Chinese industrial policy efforts. Agriculture, infrastructure, construction and services were 
included in the list of pillar industries. The Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001 to 2005) marked 
renewed systemic industrial and technology policy efforts. A number of other policy measures 
have been introduced since 2005 as part of subsequent five-year plans. The policy model has 
increasingly relied on the involvement of provinces and municipalities. Policy co-ordination is 
achieved through the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which drafts 
industrial plans for the State Council but also collates inputs from the Communist Party of 
China (CCP) Central Committee, and provincial and municipal governments (Dorn and 
Cloutier, 2013).  
 
As a result of this accelerated process of structural change and the new industrial policy 
approach, China has entered a path of indigenous innovation (zizhu chuangxin). Berger 
(2013:145) shows that, until 2005, there was limited evidence of domestic innovation 
capabilities. Thereafter, companies in high-tech sectors developed enhanced capabilities 
(increasingly mastering the scale-up of complex system products and processes, translating 
into advanced product design and advanced manufacturing, and reducing the time to the 
market). Companies have also developed redesign, reverse and re-engineering competencies 
(re-assembling foreign components, changing functions and materials, and product 
characterisation). Thus, these companies are increasingly able to produce products with 
‘Japanese [good enough] quality at Chinese prices’, making them striking examples of the 
success of China’s new industrialisation policies. 
 
3.1.2 Keeping pace: The innovation funding model and the case of InnoFund  
 
Since the 1980s, China has adopted several technologies and R&D-financing policies to keep 
pace with technological change. In 1986, the National High-Tech Development Plan (also 
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known as the 863 Plan) introduced the first articulated national technology strategy targeting 
biotechnology, space, information technology, laser technology, automation, energy and new 
materials. This technology plan was updated over time to include emerging technologies, such 
as telecommunications (1992) and marine technology (1996). The Torch Programme was 
initiated in 1988. It promoted (i) hi-tech cluster development around Science and Technology 
Industrial Parks (STIPs), Software Parks, and Productivity Promotion Centres (Innovation 
Clusters); (ii) high-tech business start-up services (Technology Business Incubators); and (iii) 
financial services for innovation (InnoFund and the Venture Guiding Fund). Indeed, China 
relied on a full range of financial and non-financial incentives to catch up technologically and 
develop innovation capabilities (Zhou et al., 2016). 
 
In the deployment of these different measures, the government developed an innovative 
funding model to support technological innovation. What makes this model particularly 
innovative is the fact that it integrates several streams of financing, each of them featuring 
strong policy directionality. The case of the InnoFund sheds some lights on the Chinese 
approach to funding innovation. 
 
InnoFund was set up in 1999 as a special government R&D programme to support investments 
in early stages of technology development. It aims to “facilitate and encourage the innovation 
activities of small and medium-technology based enterprises (SMTEs) and commercialization 
of research by way of financing, trying to bring along and attract outside financing for corporate 
R&D investment of SMTEs” (InnoFund, 2018). InnoFund has precisely-defined eligibility 
criteria, and provides different types of financial support targeting different types of companies 
at different stages of development, from loan interest subsidies to equity investment (Guo et 
al., 2016). Strict eligibility criteria are critical in bringing selectivity and directionality to the 
policy scheme. 
 
To be eligible, a project should i) comply with national industrial technology policies; ii) 
exhibit high potential for social and economic impact; and iii) be competitive in the market. 
Companies interested in applying for financing should be a business corporation with no more 
than 500 employees, 30% of whom must have received higher education. Moreover, the 
company must show annual R&D investment of at least 3% of total sales, with at least 10% of 
employees dedicated to R&D. If the company is operating in an industrial sector with high 
economies-of-scale potential, it must also exhibit good economic performance. 
 
Among qualifying companies, the following projects are given priority (Zhang and Stough, 
2013; Guo et al., 2016):  
i. Projects with advanced technology content or independent intellectual property rights 
and high value added; 
ii. Projects established by researchers or oversees returnees interested in commercialising 
their scientific achievements; 
iii. Innovation projects jointly initiated by firms, universities and other research 
institutions; and 
iv. Projects that utilise new and advanced technologies to drive industrial restructuring in 
traditional sectors and job creation. 
 
A key feature of this programme is the availability of different forms of financing, which allow 
for targeted industrial financing, acknowledging that companies have different financial needs. 
i. Appropriation: start-up capital for small firms created and owned by a researcher with 
scientific achievement and potential for commercialisation of the innovation. 
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ii. Partial subsidies: offered to SMEs engaged in the development of a new product or the 
setting up of a new production pilot line. The total amount of subsidies is between one 
and two million renminbi (RMB), with firms required to match the subsidy one-to-one.  
iii. Interest-free loans: provided to SMEs for expanding and scaling up the production of 
innovative products as a substitute for commercial bank funding. 
iv. Equity investments: only for investments in advanced technologies, for companies with 
high capacity and for products with high potential in emerging industries. Equity 
investments should not exceed 20% of the registered capital of the firm. In some cases, 
the government can also provide bank loan insurance to improve the financing terms of 
commercial banks. 
 
The governance structure of such articulated programmes relies on two levels of governance 
agencies (Wang, 2013). The InnoFund Administration Centre (IAC) is the central authority 
under the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and is responsible for: i) the 
identification of the preferred technology applications and industries, and developing the 
application guidelines; ii) the ex-ante screening and evaluation of the applications; iii) issuing 
the contract with the selected firms; and iv) post-investment project assessment. All these 
funding operations are regulated and monitored by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which 
approves the yearly budget, releases funding to the IAC twice annually, and assesses its 
performance. The MOF and MOST produce joint annual reports on the InnoFund programme, 
and these are reviewed by the State Council. 
 
At the local level, there are InnoFund offices in each province and these operate under the 
Provincial Science and Technology Committee. After 2005, the provincial offices received 
greater power from the Centre and were put in charge of many functions originally performed 
by the central IAC. The provincial offices had been mere recommendatory bodies before 2005 
and, when the central office approved a funding application, the provincial Bureau of Finance 
was expected to co-fund the allocated funding by 50%. Since 2005, the provincial committees 
have increasingly been involved in project selection, and a new application and screening 
system has been introduced. Local InnoFund offices have been given a 30% weight in the final 
decision made by the central IAC office as part of a move towards more decentralisation and 
greater involvement of local government in decision-making as well as funding (InnoFund, 
2018). 
 
The exclusive ex-ante project screening performed by the central IAC presented two main 
challenges. First, the hierarchical system presented several inefficiencies and was not very 
transparent. Second, the central offices did not have as good an understanding of local 
industrial conditions and opportunities as did local offices. As a result of the subsequent de-
centralisation, the policy process was made more responsive and it became possible to monitor 
the investments more closely. According to Guo et al. (2016), the system has become even 
more articulated since 2005, with provincial offices involving more agencies in decision-
making, and delegating decisions to lower levels. These innovations in the governance 
settlement have been particularly common in the most advanced regions, including Zhejiang. 
The governance de-centralisation has also been mirrored by an increasing shift from central 
transfer to local resources mobilisation. Since 2005, the provincial governments have increased 
their investments in the InnoFund scheme six-fold. 
 
According to official reports, InnoFund has a 1:11 multiplier effect in terms of inducing 
external financing and has succeeded in the incubation of world-leading companies, including 
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the ICT giant Huawei. After only ten years of operation, 82 of the 273 companies publicly 
listed on China’s SME Stock Exchange were former InnoFund-supported companies. 
 
3.2 Brazil 
 
Brazil underwent three major phases of industrial development and policy. The first wave 
lasted until 1980 and was characterised by extensive state-indicative planning in the areas of 
sectoral development (e.g. steel, petrochemical and renewable fuels policies) and trade 
protection (e.g. ad valorem tariffs and law of similarities). Industrial policy was aimed mainly 
at creating new industrial sectors, shifting away from specialisation in primary commodities, 
and promoting technology-intensive activities. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Brazilian 
government shifted away from industrial policy and import substitution in favour of structural 
adjustment policies and macroeconomic stabilisation. Structural adjustment policies were 
initially directed at trade liberalisation and the privatisation of public enterprises, while from 
the mid-1990s they increasingly focused on macroeconomic stabilisation (the ‘Real Plan’). The 
2000s signalled the return of selective (sector-specific) industrial policies to Brazil. In 
November 2003, the first Lula government announced the Guidelines for an Industrial, 
Technology and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE) aimed at increasing industrial competitiveness 
by boosting technological development in key sectors (semi-conductors, software, 
pharmaceuticals and medicines, and capital goods), thus promoting the export of higher value-
added products. 
 
3.2.1 Breaking into, linking up and back 
 
The main industrial policy strategy adopted by the Brazilian government between the 1950s 
and 1970s was based on a protectionist regime structured around ad valorem tariffs. The Law 
of Similarities (Lei do Similar Nacional) stated that a product could only be imported if it could 
be proven that a similar product was not produced in Brazil. These measures were intensified 
during the period from 1960 to 1980 within an import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
strategy. The main aim of this import-substitution strategy was to develop and diversify the 
domestic production system.  
 
Similarly to China, a number of state-owned enterprises were developed in strategic 
manufacturing sectors, such as Petrobras (1953), Usiminas (1956), Eletrobras (1962) and 
Embraer (1969), and the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) was established in 1952. 
Some of these companies and institutions are today the pillars of the Brazilian industrial and 
financial system. For example, BNDES is the main provider of long-term finance in the 
country, and one of the biggest in the world measured by assets, equity and disbursement 
(Ferraz and Coutinho, 2019). Differently from China, however, the Brazilian SOEs did not play 
the same industrial co-ordination role and did not support the development of a local production 
system of firms capable of operating both domestically and internationally.  
 
The lack of strategic export-promotion strategies alongside the import-substitution ones did not 
allow Brazil to link up to global value chains to the same extent as China, and while import 
substitution allowed for diversification and the development of some local production system 
linkages, domestic companies did not manage to keep pace with technological change. The 
macroeconomic crisis and following structural adjustment period further exacerbated the 
already discontinuous industrialisation pathway in Brazil.  
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With the return to industrial policy in the 2000s and the publication of PITCE, a stronger 
emphasis was put on technology policies and regulations aimed at advancing Brazil’s science 
and technology bases in biotechnology, nanotechnology and biomass/renewable energies. 
These technologies were considered critical to keep pace with technological changes in the oil 
and gas, agriculture, and pharmaceutical sectors. The government relied mainly on specific 
financing programmes, such as Profarma (pharmaceutical) and Prosoft (software), as well as 
the integration of over 15 sectoral funds to achieve these goals. PITCE also represented an 
opportunity to address a number of misalignments across the different funding schemes for 
industrial research – thus “eliminating duplication and scattershot initiatives” (ABDI, 
2006:20), as well as re-aligning financial incentives and other complementary legislation 
concerning intellectual property rights (IPR) and public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
 
The PITCE was followed by an ambitious industrial policy package, called the Productive 
Development Policy (2008-2011), and the Plano Brazil Maior, launched immediately 
afterwards in 2011. The Productive Development Policy (PDP) was structured around four 
challenges: First, maintaining the rate of growth in investment above GDP growth; second, 
upgrading and diversifying the export basket; third, fostering technological investment and 
innovation; and fourth, restructuring the industrial system and supporting SMEs and national 
industrial drivers. The PDP is a complex industrial policy package aligned with specific macro-
targets and comprising 425 policy measures (organised into 34 programmes, including both 
‘sectoral’ and ‘systemic’ actions). The sectoral actions expand PITCE’s targets along three 
main lines: ‘Mobilization Programmes in Strategic Areas’, ‘Programmes to Strengthen 
Competitiveness’, and ‘Programmes to Consolidate and Expand Leadership’ (Kupfer et al., 
2013). The management and implementation of this complex package of interventions has 
proven extremely challenging, and in some cases the lack of focus has had a negative effect on 
outcomes. 
 
The Plano Brazil Maior (PBM) was launched in 2011, and signalled the last recent systematic 
attempt by the Brazilian government at implementing industrial policy for escaping the middle-
income trap and achieving sustained growth. The ‘strategic map’ underpinning the PBM 
identifies four interdependent guiding principles/objectives. The first is strengthening critical 
competencies in production capacity, corporate R&D and industrial skills; second is enhancing 
value chains through structural upgrading and re-organisation of production systems; third, 
expanding both domestic and foreign markets beyond specialisation in primary goods; and 
finally, greater social and environmental sustainability.  
 
Various policy measures have been adopted to implement these guidelines, and in many 
respects improving Brazilian companies’ capabilities in linking up internationally and linking 
back to the local production system. For example, the PBM strengthens production chains, 
diversifies/upgrades exports through tax relief, and offers trade remedies (e.g. anti-dumping 
measures), financing, and loan guarantees for exporters (especially for SMEs). More short-
term measures were also integrated into the plan, as well as systemic and long-term measures 
like infrastructure development and demand-side interventions (e.g. the government 
procurement policy was updated).  
 
Despite these ambitious attempts, the implementation and enforcement of industrial policy 
initiatives since 2000 has lacked continuity and focus, and upgrading coalitions of interests 
failed to consolidate. As a result, policies did not manage to address the systemic weaknesses 
of the Brazilian industrial system, especially with respect to its engagement with the global 
economy. The Brazilian industrial sector did not manage to break into the global markets; in 
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fact, after an initial recovery of its manufacturing value addition, industrial performances were 
stagnant after 2007 and finally started declining again after 2015 (see Figure 4). There is a 
significant exception in the Brazilian industrialisation journey, however, and this is its 
successful development of natural resource-processing industries and food production. The 
development of technological and innovation capabilities in this sector followed a different 
model from the one described in the China case, and relied mainly on a capillary network of 
intermediate institutes specialising in technology service provision. 
 
3.2.2 Keeping pace: The intermediate technology institutions model and the case of Embrapa 
 
Brazil is today among the top producers and exporters of orange juice, sugar, coffee, soya 
beans, beef, pork and chicken, as well as having caught up with the traditional big five grain 
exporters. At the centre of the transformative policy package implemented in Brazil is a 
network of intermediate institutes called Embrapa, which have fostered technological change, 
diversification and upgrading in agriculture and farming. Embrapa was founded in 1972 in 
response to the weaknesses of DNPEA (the National Agricultural Research and Experiment 
Department). These weaknesses included “researchers’ lack of awareness of the basic needs of 
agriculture and the lack of intradepartmental and external interaction among researchers, 
extension workers, and farmers (which had led to instances of unproductive duplication of 
research efforts)” (Beintema et al., 2001:16). Other weaknesses involved “the lack of incentives 
for researchers (particularly indicated by low salaries), the low level of postgraduate training 
(12 percent [of] the scientific staff at the time), and finally the insufficient, and often irregular 
financial resources available” (Beintema et al., 2001:16). Embrapa took over the DNPEA’s 
extensive network of research institutes, covering the main agricultural commodities and 
regions, experiment stations and existing projects. Agricultural extension services were outside 
Embrapa’s area of intervention and were assigned to another agency, Embrater, which operated 
until 1991.  
 
The institutional development of Embrapa and its impact on the agricultural sector took several 
years to manifest. Indeed, building a network of intermediate technology institutes presents 
several challenges. Institutes need to develop both generic technologies as well as product-
specific technology and must invest in the acquisition of infra-technologies, such as testing 
facilities, and metrology and data systems, without which products cannot be developed or 
brought to the international markets. Making these hardware technologies work also calls for 
organisational capabilities and system-process building, such as standards and certification 
processes. The co-location of institutes in specific regional areas is critical to reflect the 
heterogeneity of agricultural production and needs. Moreover, internal training (and re-training 
of the existing workforce) alongside technology transfer and acquisition are needed to build 
technological capabilities. Finally, incentives must be designed to make the institutes both 
capable and willing to engage with companies.  
 
During its first decades, Embrapa created a network of national commodity centres and 
regional centres that focused on major cropping and animal production systems, as well as on 
eco-regional and national themes. It also increased its internal capabilities by signing 
partnerships with US universities, which allowed Embrapa’s staff to receive postgraduate 
training. In 1993, the establishment of the Embrapa Planning System (SEP) introduced a 
systems approach to R&D planning. This allowed a redefinition and reintegration of the 
centre’s mission, objectives, programmes, human resources, infrastructural needs and 
priorities. From the late 1980s, agricultural research became increasingly cross-pollinated by 
research in advanced manufacturing. A good example of this is the satellite monitoring services 
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for the acquisition and processing of remote sensor images and field data. The Satellite 
Monitoring Centre was created in 1989 in an area of 20 000 m2 in Campinas, assigned by the 
Brazilian Army to Embrapa for the development of a special unit focused on territorial 
management systems and electronic networks for modern agriculture.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, Embrapa was involved in a wide range of activities related to 
agricultural research and technology, including plant breeding, pest management, food safety, 
satellite monitoring, sustainable agricultural development, and hunger relief. Crop research 
activities are carried out at locations around the country to develop crops and varieties that are 
suited for local conditions (Matthey et al., 2004:10). Investments at the interface between 
agriculture, biotechnologies and advanced manufacturing included facilities for quality 
improvement in the meat production chain; an aquaculture laboratory prioritising water quality 
control, fish feeding and health; an Oenology Laboratory to boost wine production in the north-
eastern semi-arid region; one of the world’s first National Agribusiness Nanotechnology 
Laboratories, focused on the development of sensors and biosensors for food quality control, 
certification and traceability and the synthesis of new materials such as polymers and 
nanostructured materials or thin films and surface-to-manufacture smart packages; and six new 
walk-in freezers to increase the storage and preservation capacity of the Embrapa Germplasm 
Bank. 
 
A remarkable achievement of Embrapa has been the claiming of the Cerrado (the Brazilian 
savannah) for modern agriculture. It introduced “new varieties, cultural practices, zoning, 
tillage, biological fixation of nitrogen, development of livestock for both meat and milk, 
vegetables, fruit, irrigation and knowledge of the Cerrado natural resource basis” (Alves, 
2010:70). Embrapa’s technological efforts were reinforced by government investment, which 
established new universities and postgraduate courses in all states of the Cerrado region. 
Similar to Fraunhofers in Germany, Embrapa started playing a critical intermediary role 
between agricultural and manufacturing R&D, education, markets, and on-farm agricultural 
production. It also bridges and transfers knowledge, technical solutions and innovations across 
different sectors, thus facilitating various forms of inter-sectoral learning (Andreoni & Chang, 
2014). Embrapa has generated and recommended more than nine thousand technologies for 
Brazilian farmers since its inception in 1973.  
 
The success of this model has more recently led to the establishment of another organisation, 
focusing on industrial innovation, namely Embrapii (Brazilian Company of Research and 
Industrial Innovation). This is a Social Organization by the Federal Public Power, which, since 
2013, supports technological research institutions by reducing risk in enterprises’ RD&I 
projects. The non-reimbursable funds managed by Embrapii are invested in innovation projects 
undertaken between enterprises and Embrapii units and hubs. These units and hubs are 
technologically focused Innovation Centres with technical capabilities to meet firms’ needs for 
technological solutions and innovations. By 2018, Embrapii had 28 units of excellence centred 
in the following technology platforms: information and communication technologies, 
mechanics and manufacturing, materials and chemistry, biotechnologies and applied 
technologies. 
 
3.3 South Africa 
 
With democratisation in 1994, the first post-Apartheid South African government aimed to 
develop a new industrial policy framework, as seen for instance in the 1995 dti (Department of 
Trade and Industry) document, Support Measures for the Enhancement of the International 
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Competitiveness of South Africa’s Industrial Sector. There was a fundamental shift from a 
‘demand-side’ to a ‘supply-side’ industrial-promotion approach. The former refers to the past 
practice of promoting certain industries by providing a ‘captive market’ for producers through 
tariffs, quotas and other policy measures. Similar to Brazil, the allocation of protection to 
domestic producers via import substitution was not coupled with export promotion initiatives, 
and companies failed to break in internationally and link up to global value chains. When 
‘supply-side’ measures were introduced, and more emphasis was given to technological 
upgrading, policies were mainly horizontal and relied almost exclusively on financial 
incentives. Different from China, however, the provision of financial incentives for developing 
industrial competitiveness did not deliver the desired results, due to the lack of the same 
political economy conditions as well as factors including inadequate scale of industrial policy, 
rapid trade liberalisation and lack of attention to the need for fundamental structural 
transformation, as discussed further below.  
 
3.3.1 Breaking into, linking up and back 
 
Between 1994 and 2007, industrial policy in South Africa relied mainly on financial incentives 
for capital investments, R&D and human resource development. The rationale was to enable 
producers to increase their domestic and international market share by increasing productivity. 
These supply-side measures were horizontal in nature, not focusing on any particular segments 
of manufacturing. Consequently, they were fairly thinly spread (excluding the auto and 
clothing/textile sectors, which had sector-specific programmes) and had limited impact. As part 
of this shift, government also undertook a rapid and sweeping trade liberalisation programme 
(see Erten et al,, 2019).  
 
Rapid trade liberalisation, combined with horizontal industrial policies, comprise a particularly 
harmful mix of policies, as it can have a dramatic impact on the local production system. 
Exposure to competitive products from abroad, and a lack of selective instruments to steer 
needed industrial restructuring, tend to break domestic production linkages and further 
disconnect potential export-oriented companies from their domestic industrial base. As a result, 
as shown in Figure 2, the foreign content of domestic value addition doubled during this period 
and, more than linking back, the local production system was pushed out.  
 
Far from being a comprehensive set of industrial policies, the focus was mainly 
microeconomic, and little attention was paid to the fundamental structural transformation of 
the economy during the period 1994 to 2007. The limited industrial policies during this period 
were also undermined by austere macroeconomic policies, especially in the late 1990s. These 
policies did not lead to a substantial deepening of the industrial base, did not promote 
significant industrial diversification away from mining and minerals, and largely ignored the 
challenges of an overvalued exchange rate (Zalk, 2011).  
 
Moreover, despite an emphasis on supply-side interventions, these strategies paid relatively 
limited attention to the much-needed increase in physical and infrastructural investments. South 
African physical investment had been collapsing since the mid-1980s, from around 30% of 
GDP to well under 20% in the early 1990s (16.7%). Although investments went up again in 
the second half of the 1990s, to over 20%, South Africa’s investment rates remained far below 
those typically observed in well-performing middle-income developing countries. During the 
same periods, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and China managed an investment/GDP ratio of 40% 
(and sometimes even above), and many other developing economies invested around 30% of 
their GDP. 
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One of the constraints on the effectiveness of industrial policy has been weak policy co-
ordination and alignment with the broader macroeconomic, education, trade and other relevant 
policy areas (Tregenna, 2011). To a certain extent, this lack of co-ordination reflected the high 
degree of fragmentation in the political economy situation in the country, with several powerful 
groups capturing segments of the public sector. Lack of policy co-ordination was exacerbated 
by conflicting policy goals. Specifically, given the dramatic social tensions and extreme 
inequalities in South Africa, as well as low growth and lack of structural transformation, 
industrial policy had to be responsive to multiple policy objectives.  
 
On the one hand, there was a productive transformation policy goal, consisting of the 
expansion of the manufacturing base and, in particular, of the development of medium- to high-
tech manufacturing sectors, which tend to be relatively capital-intensive. On the other hand, 
there was an employment-generation policy goal, consisting of the reduction of unemployment 
and social tension though the support of those economic sectors that are expected to have a 
relatively higher job-absorption capacity in the short- to medium-term. Linked to this has been 
a growing emphasis on advancing black participation in manufacturing through ownership and 
management, particularly with the Black Industrialist programme launched in 2016. 
  
The National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) of 2007, and the associated Industrial Policy 
Action Plans that followed, marked a new shift in industrial policy in South Africa, in particular 
from 2009 onwards, when there were increases in allocations to industrial policy and financing. 
With the Industrial Policy Action Plan 2013-16 (IPAP, 2013), the government attempted to 
address the trade-off between manufacturing development and employment expansion 
discussed above. The development of manufacturing industries was recognised as the priority, 
especially considering that the consumption-driven sectors were growing twice as fast as the 
productive sectors, with extremely high levels of structural unemployment. 
In the 2013/2014 IPAP, the South African government also set a target of increasing research 
and development expenditure to at least 1% of GDP and sustaining it there. This important 
shift was driven by the recognition of the increasing global technological race, and the need for 
South Africa to build innovation and technological capabilities for more domestic value 
addition. In view of addressing this challenge, the South African government relied mainly on 
financial incentives and financing schemes. While these are relatively simpler instruments to 
design and implement – for example, they do not require the building of a network of 
institutions as in the case of Embrapa discussed above – they are more difficult to enforce, 
especially in a highly fragmented political economy context. 
 
3.3.2 Keeping pace: The matching grant commercialisation model and the case of the 
Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme (MCEP) 
 
Recent IPAP iterations have structured industrial support measures along two main axes, 
sector-specific programmes and transversal policies. Sectoral interventions have been broadly 
divided between sectors that were already supported from 2007 (cluster 1), and additional 
priorities that include qualitatively new areas of intervention in cluster 2 (e.g. green industries), 
as well as longer-term targets for the development of capabilities in advanced manufacturing 
in cluster 3 (e.g. nuclear and aerospace industries). The following sectors were targeted as part 
of the sector-specific programmes: automotive, medium and heavy commercial, clothing, 
textile, leather and footwear. Among these vertical interventions, it is possible to roughly 
distinguish between approaches that generally affected the whole subsector and approaches 
that more directly affected specific manufacturing firms. Examples of the first group include 
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the proposed intervention for biofuels, as well as the pharma sector intervention that aimed to 
increase production capacity and skills enhancement for the whole subsector (e.g. through new 
criteria for local procurement in tenders of the Department of Health, as well as the 
development of a sectoral skills strategy) (see IPAP 2013 to 2016). As for policies affecting 
specific firms, two programmes were central: (i) the automotive scheme (the Automotive 
Production and Development Programme (APDP)5), awarding cash grants to individual firms 
to invest in productive assets (machinery, equipment, etc.); and (ii) the clothing/textiles scheme 
(CTCP), providing grants to individual firms to upgrade the skill levels of their labour force or 
to invest in product and process improvements. The most striking examples of transversal 
interventions can be found in the finance area. The ‘12I’ Tax Allowance Incentive and the 
Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme (MCEP) both tackled the finance 
constraints on the firm level, with significant tax allowances (12I) and grants for capital 
expenditure (MCEP) awarded to individual enterprises. 
  
The MCEP was the key action programme under the industrial financing pillar of IPAP and it 
aimed at increased industrial competitiveness through better access to financial capital. The 
programme provided matching grant finance to manufacturing firms to invest in 
competitiveness enhancement by upgrading production facilities, processes, products and 
people, and it sought to maximise employment and value-added potential in strategic sectors 
set out in the IPAP (see IPAP 2012 to 2015). The scheme consisted of seven sub-components, 
five of which were managed by the dti and two by the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC).6 
 
Applicants could apply for one or a combination of the MCEP sub-programmes at company 
level. Within the dti components of MCEP, firms could apply for a matching grant, and 
qualifying investment activities included capital equipment for upgrading and expansions; 
green technology upgrades for cleaner production and resource-efficiency activities; 
enterprise-level competitiveness improvement activities for new or increased market access, 
product and process improvements; related skills development; and conducting feasibility 
studies. One component allowed for clusters of firms to apply for a grant for their collective 
efforts.  
 
The programme was of significant size, and was scheduled to run over five years (2012 to 
2017). In terms of sectoral distribution, the scheme was introduced as a horizontal intervention 
and in general allowed most manufacturing firms to apply, although sectors that are covered 
by similar sector-specific grant schemes (e.g. automotive and textiles) were usually not eligible. 
However, actual approvals show a strong sectoral focus on the agro-processing (36 grants 
worth R383 million), metals (62 grants worth R259 million) and chemicals (26 grants worth 
R117 million) sectors in 2012/13. The three sectors jointly accounted for 77% of the volume 
of all grants in this period (IDAD, 2013). 
 
While the dti regularly engages in the implementation of financing schemes for manufacturing 
firms such as the MCEP itself, e.g. for the provision of capital expenditure grants, South Africa 
also has two dedicated industrial financing institutions (in addition to other non-industrial 
development finance institutions). Firstly, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was 
                                                          
5 The APDP replaced the earlier Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) in 2013. See, for example, 
Barnes and Morris, 2008; Barnes, 2013; and Black, 2009, 2017 on industrial development and industrial policy 
related specifically to the auto sector in South Africa. 
6 The IDC components are a pre- and post-dispatch working capital loan facility and the Industrial Policy Niche 
Projects Fund. 
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set up in 1940 to promote economic growth and industrial development and is owned by the 
South African government. It provides loan and equity funding to private industrial firms. 
Secondly, the Export Credit Insurance Corporation (ECIC), which is a state-owned agency 
established in 2001. The ECIC facilitates South African export trade by underwriting export 
credit loans and investments outside the country. 
 
Emphasising the strategic importance of these institutions, several IPAPs argued that, given 
the scale of competitor banks such as the China Development Bank and the Brazilian BNDES, 
these institutions should secure agreement on a collaborative approach to identify and unlock 
opportunities for support to South African and African manufacturers (see the 2014/15 and 
2016/2017 IPAP).  
 
In sum, the financial support measures to address the middle-income technology trap in South 
Africa consist of two main legs: 1) grant schemes administered by the dti, and 2) the provision 
of (working capital) loans, as well as equity and debt financing, by the IDC. This two-pronged 
approach follows a certain logic. The matching grant schemes are put in place to mitigate the 
major constraint of access to finance quickly by injecting capital directly into manufacturing 
firms. However, as this approach will only relieve the financial constraint facing the 
manufacturing sector temporarily, this needs to be complemented by actions to increase access 
to finance in the longer term. The IDC and other industrial financing institutions could 
eventually assume this role, but this would require changes in both the scale and nature of their 
financing.  
 
Given the existing misalignments and fragmentation in the matching grant scheme, as well as 
the lack of clear parameters for selecting firms and enforcing the policy, the last iterations and 
revisions of the IPAP have pointed to the need for a ‘re-calibration’ of existing dti incentives, 
with the ultimate aim of a more targeted approach for financial incentives. The 2013/2014 
IPAP also recognises the existence of intervention gaps and misalignments along the 
innovation value chain, and the need to review and restructure existing programmes within the 
Department of Science and Technology’s National Research and Development Strategy. In 
particular, the 2014/2015 to 2016/2017 IPAP stresses the importance of: (i) supporting large 
research and development programmes (cross-cutting, innovative and sustainable) in 
knowledge-intensive areas within the Emerging Industries Action Plan (EIAP); (ii) supporting 
both existing and new technology-based SMEs to access the technological infrastructure (such 
as incubation services) and innovation support programmes; and (iii) addressing industrial 
scalability and commercialisation challenges within a comprehensive technology-
commercialisation strategy. 
 
By mapping funding schemes and supporting programmes, the South African government is 
aiming to address, in a selective way, those specific funding gaps, but also dysfunctional 
overlaps and duplications that result in bottlenecks or effort-wasting along the innovation 
journey. Indeed, this mapping exercise constitutes a fundamental step in redesigning the 
technological infrastructure of South Africa in order to improve its effectiveness in supporting 
industrial and technological upgrading. While expanding the production capacity of the country 
is critical in order to reach efficiency-scale and high-volume production, the application of 
innovative technologies in production and product systems and sub-components development 
is critical to allow South Africa to capture increasing value from international trade. 
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4. Comparative analysis and industrial policy lessons 
 
Middle-income countries develop along very distinctive structural trajectories. In some cases, 
some countries are considerably more successful than others, although all of them experience 
some degrees of success and failures. These differences are shaped partly by the different types 
of policy instruments, institutions and governance models they use in addressing their 
industrialisation challenges as they reach, and attempt to surpass, middle-income status. The 
three case studies documented here present some common features, as well as three distinctive 
ways of promoting technological upgrading beyond the middle-income technology trap.  
 
4.1 Commonalities 
 
4.1.1 Variety of industrial policy instruments and institutions 
 
The middle-income countries we focus on – China, Brazil and South Africa – have all relied 
on a variety of industrial policy instruments and institutions throughout their development 
journey. These policies and institutions play different – but also highly complementary – 
functions in terms of allowing the middle-income country in break into the global market, 
linking up to global value chains, linking back to the local production system, and keeping pace 
with technological change. Table 1 summaries the main instruments adopted by the three 
countries in this regard.  
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Table 1: Industrial policy to escape the middle-income technology trap  
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Challenge 
 
Industrial 
policy 
China  Brazil South Africa 
Breaking into Selective 
sectoral 
promotion 
policies 
X X X 
Building 
national 
champions 
X X  
Industrial 
consolidation 
(e.g. M&A) 
X   
Export-
promotion 
services 
X   
Development 
banks and 
finance 
X X  
Linking up FDI policy X X X 
Joint ventures 
and technology 
transfer 
X X X 
Export 
incentives 
X X X 
Export-
promotion 
zones 
X   
Export finance X   
Linking back Selective trade 
policy 
X X X 
Local content 
policy 
X X X 
Joint ventures 
and technology 
transfer 
X X X 
Capital 
investment 
finance 
X X  
Technical and 
vocational 
training 
X X X 
Technology 
intermediate 
institutes 
X X  
Keeping pace R&D incentives X X  
Matching grants 
and subsidies 
X X X 
Hybrid finance 
and soft loans 
X   
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Technology 
intermediate 
institutes 
X X  
Joint ventures 
and technology 
transfer 
X X X 
Source: Authors 
 
While many of these instruments are used across all these countries – and indeed many other 
middle-income countries – even when they are similar there is heterogeneity in terms of 
specific policy and institutional design features. Despite these differences, our case studies 
have shown two broad industrial policy models. These are industrial policy relying on financial 
incentives, rents and other monetary transfers on the one hand (this was detailed in the case 
study of the InnoFund in China and the MCEP in South Africa); and industrial policy relying 
on the provision of production, technological and industrial services, including the provision 
of intermediate technologies, training and market services for export on the other (this was 
highlighted in the case study of Embrapa in Brazil). 
 
4.1.2 Industrial policy alignment and co-ordination 
 
Independently of the technology policy model adopted and its integration into a broader 
industrial policy package, all three countries had to align their industrial policy with the 
evolving needs of their industrial systems. Specifically, following the structural cycles of 
technological change and the reconfigurations in the industrial organisation of different sectors, 
and in response to changes in the global industrial landscape, the governments of China, Brazil 
and South Africa had to change their policy approach and targets. At different points in time, 
approaching middle-income status has been concomitant with a shift towards increasing 
investments in the development and accumulation of technological and innovation capabilities. 
Indeed, when a middle-income country exhausts its traditional developing-country advantages, 
government has to step up its industrialisation targets and equip the industrial system with more 
instruments to grab hold of and climb the global technology ladder. The commitment of 
resources becomes increasingly demanding, especially in a country such as South Africa, in 
which industrial policy investments are inadequately complemented by sustained private 
investments. 
 
The need for designing and co-ordinating different institutions and levels of governance is 
another common feature of the three middle-income countries discussed here. Within the public 
sector, the government is articulated in different ministries, departments and agencies operating 
at both the national and sub-national levels. However, in some cases, public departments and 
agencies diverge in their interests – for example in the case of national and more local 
institutions – or might operate in silos, sometimes entering into fights to control resources. The 
ongoing need to co-ordinate multi-governance structures and to avoid risks of institutional and 
policy fragmentation is common across all three middle-income countries studied here, 
although some of them are more successful than others in implementing functioning 
governance models. Examples are the decentralised model adopted by China through the 
InnoFund programme, and the complex institutional arrangements adopted by Embrapa to 
manage a complex web of technology intermediary centres across a vast country like Brazil. 
The South African case has shown the risks of governance fragmentation, resulting both from 
limited targeting in policy design and the existence of different conflicting claims and diverging 
private interests. Related to this, a key difference between the three country cases lies in the 
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extent to which industrial policy has been co-ordinated with other relevant policy domains – 
macroeconomic policy, policies around R&D and innovation, skills development and so on. 
 
4.1.3 Industrial policy feasibility and enforceability 
 
Another common feature is the challenge that all countries face in designing policies that are 
feasible and enforceable by the country’s institutions. The Chinese case, in particular, shows 
the importance of embedding principles of enforcement in the early stages of policy design. 
The meticulous design and balance of carrots and sticks in innovation funds, and the mixing of 
different types of grants, interest-free loans and long-term loans, and public procurement, 
demonstrate a complex system of incentives that target and match firms’ different capabilities. 
Similarly, the design and coherent alignment of incentives represent a significant challenge in 
the case of South Africa, in some cases posing questions about the real additionality of these 
interventions. 
 
In all cases, the relationship between the government and the private sector matters. Experience 
shows the importance of continuous dialogue and exchange of information between the two if 
the policies are going to be well informed and relevant. However, it is also important that the 
government does not become beholden to particular industrial interests, and thus face the 
danger of ‘capture’. Evans (1995) has described this point with the notion of ‘embedded 
autonomy’, meaning that government needs to have roots in society (‘embeddedness’), but 
must also have its own will and power (‘autonomy’) in order to be effective in its interventions. 
In understanding the relationship between the government and the private sector, it is critical 
to start from assessing the distribution of organisational power in both the public and private 
sectors – thus, the countries’ “political settlement” (Khan, 2010) – and the relationship between 
powerful organisations (including elites and intermediate groups) operating in both (and at the 
interface between) the public and private sectors. The analysis of a country’s political 
settlement allows for the assessment of the feasibility of certain policy interventions, and thus 
the extent to which a certain policy instrument can be implemented and enforced in a given 
political settlement. 
 
Industrial policy for the building of productive capabilities can play a central role in 
transforming the private sector and moving towards a more balanced distribution of power. By 
mobilising resources towards productive forces in the private sector, and creating incentives 
for technological upgrading and for the building up of the local production system, industrial 
policy can make productive investments feasible and profitable. However, to be effective, the 
design, implementation and enforcement of industrial policy must take into consideration what 
specific resources and incentives the different players along different sectoral value chains will 
need to become more productive. 
 
4.2 Differences 
 
Despite all these commonalities, the three case studies also point to three very different policy 
approaches, as highlighted in Figure 5.  
 
The experience of China stresses, inter alia, the importance of long-term commitment and a 
staged approach to industrial transformation, especially with respect to technological 
advancement in the manufacturing sector. InnoFund is presented as a successful case of a 
funding scheme for technology policy supporting the early stages of industrial innovation and 
technology development.  
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The Brazilian case highlights the importance of promoting the development of public 
technology intermediaries who support the absorption, adaptation and diffusion of 
technologies, especially in the intermediate stages of technology development. The Embrapa 
case study is particularly important for middle-income countries, as it suggests opportunities 
for technological development and value addition in both advanced technologies and at the 
interface between the agriculture and manufacturing sectors.  
 
The South Africa case study points to the importance of boosting investments in technology 
deployment and production operations, especially when the private sector is reticent to sustain 
high rates of investment in fixed capital and technologies. The investment in the later 
technology-development stage is also important for stimulating technology upgrading by 
technology transfer and absorption, especially in cases where the basic science and research is 
limited in scale. 
 
 
Figure 5: Keeping pace with technological change and innovation: policy initiatives 
Source: Authors 
 
 
The country cases and the different models reviewed here point to three important policy 
implications, with particular relevance for middle-income countries.  
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First, there are significant opportunities for value addition and technological development 
across different sectoral value chains, including agro-business value chains. For example, the 
innovative industrialisation of agriculture opens new venues for increasing productivity, 
upgrading global markets and diversifying. However, in order to capture these opportunities, 
public technology intermediaries must provide key technology and product services to reach 
product quality standards, and transform agricultural activities into highly productive industrial 
processes. 
 
Second, the promotion of technological upgrading in manufacturing industries cannot be done 
simply by jumping to frontier technologies. The China case study, in particular, emphasises 
how the building of a solid productive and technological capability foundation over time is a 
precondition for innovation across several industrial fields. This, of course, does not mean that 
change must be incremental or based on existing static comparative advantages; the experience 
of China demonstrates the possibilities of leapfrogging, but with a solid base built up through 
deliberate policy interventions. A related lesson is that institutions promoting technological 
innovation have to change over time to respond to the changing innovation challenges firms 
face in the fast-changing global landscape. 
 
A third policy lesson is that, to increase value addition and value capturing in the domestic 
economy, countries need to target the development of their local production systems – what 
we called here ‘linking up and back’. The building of integrated supply chains in the domestic 
economy gives countries sustained industrial and productivity growth. Therefore, industrial 
policy focusing for example on the attraction of a multinational or on the setting up of an 
export-promotion zone must be fully co-ordinated with other policy measures that support 
industrialisation. The Chinese success in linking up and back underscores the importance of 
sustaining industrial development, with multiple sets of interventions reinforcing each other in 
a co-ordinated manner. The development of the local production system as a strategy to move 
beyond the middle-income technology trap also requires engaging with technological change, 
especially taking into consideration the multiple cross-system applications of modern 
technologies.  
 
While manufacturing remains a cornerstone for re-industrialisation and technological 
development in premature de-industrialisers like South Africa and Brazil, new value-addition 
opportunities can be found at the interface with other sectors and the intersection of different 
technology systems. Well-co-ordinated and coherent industrial policy packages are critical in 
shaping new structural trajectories beyond the middle-income technology trap. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
While an extensive literature explores various aspects of the middle-income trap, here we 
propose the concept of a middle-income technology trap, referring to structural and institutional 
configurations that are not conducive to increasing domestic value addition and to sustained 
industrial and technological upgrading in middle-income economies. This trap is associated 
with what we identify as the triple challenges of ‘breaking into’ the global economy, ‘linking 
up’ into global value chains while simultaneously ‘linking back’ to the local production system, 
and ‘keeping pace’ with technological change.  
 
We explore these issues through case studies of industrial policy interventions in three 
prominent middle-income countries in Asia (the InnoFund model in China), Latin America (the 
Embrapa system in Brazil) and Africa (the MCEP in South Africa). In each case, we reflect on 
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the specific structural configuration challenges, and assess the diverse institutional and 
industrial policy responses adopted. We characterise the InnoFund model from China an 
example of a ‘funding innovation model’ and hybrid financial solutions; the Embrapa system 
in Brazil exemplifies an intermediate technology institution model supporting product, process 
and technology scaling-up stages; while we see the MCEP programme in South Africa as an 
example of a matching grant commercialisation approach, focuses primarily on the later stages 
of technology absorption and development. These case studies illustrate the diversity of ways 
in which middle-income countries have attempted to ‘break in’, ‘link up’ and ‘link back’, and 
‘keep pace’, and to avoid or escape from a middle-income technology trap.  
 
These case studies have shed light on the range of industrial policy instruments utilised, within 
what we characterise as two broad industrial policy models. Firstly, approaches based on 
financial incentives, rents and other monetary transfers, with the InnoFund in China and the 
MCEP in South Africa representing very different examples within this. Secondly, approaches 
based on the provision of production, technological and industrial services, including of 
intermediate technologies, training and market services to promote exports, as in the case of 
Embrapa in Brazil. In all three cases, countries faced the imperative of aligning their industrial 
policy with the evolving needs of their industrial systems, although they achieved this with 
varying degrees of success. This needs to be understood in the context of countries political 
economy, with particular differences between China on the one hand, and Brazil and South 
Africa on the other. 
 
The diversity in the experiences of these three cases of middle-income countries is clear. This 
is broadly in terms of their industrial policies and in their industrialisation and growth 
trajectories, and more specifically in terms of their approaches to promoting technological 
upgrading beyond the middle-income technology trap, including in the technological stages 
that are primarily targeted for support. 
 
This analysis has important policy implications, in particular for middle-income countries 
seeking to avoid a middle-income technology trap and the middle-income trap more broadly. 
We have drawn attention to three specific policy issues. Firstly, that there are considerable 
opportunities for upgrading in value chains, including in agro-business value chains, but this 
requires industrial policy support (including substantial support in key technological and 
product services) and the ‘industrialisation of at least some agricultural activities. Secondly, 
the importance of building depth of productive and technological capabilities to support 
innovation and upgrading. Thirdly, the need for countries to ‘link up’ and ‘link back’ through 
the development and integration of their local production systems, including through 
technological upgrading as a basis for sustained productivity growth. All of these require 
industrial policies that are flexible and dynamic, that are appropriate for countries’ specific 
political economic and other characteristics, that go beyond the manufacturing sector, that 
support innovation and technological upgrading as integral aspects of industrial development, 
and that are well co-ordinated with other policy domains. 
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